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As key provisions of the Voting Rights 
Act (VRA) of 1965 were being 
considered for renewal in 2005-06, 
supporters and critics competed to 
eulogize the law. "The statute 
accomplished what it was beautifully 
designed to do: ending black 
disfranchisement in the Jim Crow 
South," cooed Abigail Thernstrom, a 
critic (Thernstrom 2005). It was "the 
twentieth century's noblest and most 
transforn1ative law," George Will, a 
skeptic, chimed in (Will 2005). 
"[P]erhaps the most significant piece of 
legislation ever passed," enthused 
.T udiciary Subcommittee Chain11an Steve 
Chabot, an Ohio Republican supporter 
(Arnold 2005). 
Such rhetoric nearly always disguises 
disagreement and ignorance. Was the 
Act the result of a sudden national moral 
consensus brought about by the Alabama 
State Troopers' "Bloody Sunday" attack 
on civil rights marchers in Selma, or the 
product of a long legal struggle, 
intensified in the frustrating experiences 
of the Justice Department in trying to 
overcome the resistance ofDeep South 
registrars and judges to the 1957 and 
1960 Civil Rights Acts? Should the 
upsurge in African-American 
registration in the Deep South after 1965 
be attributed specifically to the Act's ban 
on literacy tests and provisions allowing 
the Department of Justice unfettered 
discretion in appointing federal voting 
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registrars and observers or, more 
vaguely, to a societal shift in white 
attitudes toward black disfranchisement 
as a result of the Civil Rights Movement, 
and to a new confidence among southern 
blacks in general and civil rights workers 
in particular, a byproduct of the passage 
ofthe 1964 Civil Rights Act and the 
1965 VRA? What happened in elections 
and public policy when blacks were re-
enfranchised? How should we weigh the 
short-term gains that took place after the 
Act's passage- the registration surge-
compared to the longer-term effects-
the use of the Act to attack electoral 
rules and changes in those rules that 
were designed to minimize minority 
political power? Even ifwe assume, 
without much systematic evidence, that 
incremental legal struggles, not profound 
public transformations, were the real 
keys to the voting rights drama of the 
1960s, which details ofthe Act's 
background we focus on will depend on 
whether we are trying to explain short-
term or long-term consequences. 
Fon11er Justice Department attorney 
Brian Landsberg, who helped litigate 
three voting rights cases in Alabama at 
the beginning of his career in 1964, 
devotes only brief attention to such 
larger questions at the beginning and end 
of his book, centering his limited study 
on the legal cases from Elmore, Sumter, 
and especially Perry County among the 
seventy cases that the Department 
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brought under the 1957 and 1960 Civil 
Rights Acts. He presents persuasive 
evidence that the Department's 
experience in the three and similar cases 
was crucial in the framing of the literacy, 
registrar, observer, and preclearance 
provisions of the 1965 VRA - in the 
content, not the passage of the Act (p.5). 
An analytical memoir or monographic 
autobiography, the study draws on 
insider experiences and, very heavily, on 
Justice Department records that are now 
available in the National Archives. 
Clear and often engagingly written, 
FREE AT LAST TO VOTE puts flesh 
on the conventional statement that the 
1965 Act sought to overcome southem 
intransigence, and it offers the most 
complete account yet published of the 
shaping of provisions ofthe legislation. 
Yet it leaves some puzzles, only partially 
filling one of the significant gaps -how 
and why certain sections of the VRA 
were adopted and what their original 
intent was- in our knowledge of the 
history of civil rights in America. 
At the time that the Civil Rights 
Division of the Department of Justice 
(DOJ), established by the 1957 Civil 
Rights Act, began to litigate voting 
rights cases, it had only a weak, vague 
law and few detailed precedents with 
which to assault the long-entrenched, 
resourceful interests of southem white 
political supremacy. Landsberg's is not 
a description of high legal doctrine or 
grand litigation strategies. The fifteenth 
amendment, designed to override state 
and local prerogatives, provided the 
basic legal doctrine, and Landsberg was 
too junior in 1964 to be privy to grand 
strategy, if any existed (pp. 75, 91-92). 
Because the southem voting laws did not 
discriminate on their face and southem 
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officials no longer declared their racist 
intentions openly, the DOJ had to 
document every aspect of the process 
extensively. Local intransigence at 
divulging records of registration inspired 
a provision of the 1960 Civil Rights Act 
that guaranteed the DOJ access to such 
records (pp.52-53). Landsberg's account 
of fact-gathering, which he refers to as 
"the romance of the records"-
photocopying voter registration 
documents, reading them on microfilm, 
transferring the infonnation to index 
cards, sorting and resorting the cards to 
discover pattems, and finally, presenting 
the conclusions based on these pattems 
to courts- will interest scholars who 
enjoy similar informational love affairs 
(pp.55-56). It parallels in the 
bureaucratized civil rights movement the 
dreary task of the more public movement 
in convincing appropriately frightened 
African-Americans to try to register at 
county courthouses. 
Drawing on such painstaking research, 
the DOJ legal briefs in the cases created 
new law, rather than relying on settled 
law, and they created that law out of 
facts, not case law citations or legal 
theory (p.l 00), an observation that 
reinforces the more general impression 
(not expressed by Landsberg) that civil 
rights law has developed less from 
elaboration of principles than from 
deductions from facts. To overcome 
registrar and judicial resistance, the DOJ 
had to develop innovative legal theories 
and institutional techniques, innovations 
that would eventually provide the 
mechanics of the 1965 VRA. 
That the resistance of Alabama judges 
provoked DOJ inventiveness was not the 
only irony of the struggle in the decade 
after Brown. The Alabama Attomey 
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General's effort to suppress the NAACP 
through legal actions beginning in 1956 
left a void that was filled by less 
established, less cautious civil rights 
organizations that competed with each 
other to register new black voters, 
heightening the level of activity beyond 
anything that the NAACP ever mustered 
(pp.l5-16). What these key local black 
organizations had to overcome to 
register African-Americans from the 
1950s to 1965 were a variety of literacy 
and knowledge tests, with numerous 
questions about, for example, a voter's 
past criminal convictions and loyalty to 
the constitution and the laws, the name 
of the lieutenant govemor, and excerpts 
from the constitution to be read orally, 
that gave registrars all the discretion they 
needed to refuse registration to almost 
any potential black voter, including 
teachers with masters' degrees, while 
registering virtually all whites (pp.19-20, 
43). 
In all three overwhelmingly African-
American Alabama counties, which 
shared a history of racial violence and 
oppression, records conclusively showed 
blatant discrimination by voting 
registrars. In Elmore County between 
December 1959 and February 1964, for 
example, registrars allowed 2277 whites 
and only 16 blacks to register to vote, 
excluding five percent of white and 
ninety-three percent of black applicants. 
Nonetheless, the decisions made and the 
remedies granted in the three cases 
brought by the DOJ depended entirely 
on which of the three federal judges, 
Harlan Hobart Grooms, Frank M. 
Johnson, and Daniel H. Thomas, sat on 
the case. The cautious Judge Grooms, 
who presided over the Sumter County 
case, ruled for the DOJ, but did not grant 
sufficiently far-reaching relief to prevent 
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registrars from continuing to 
discriminate (pp. 70-73). By contrast, the 
more activist civil rights proponent 
Judge Jolmson mandated the registration 
of specific blacks whose experiences had 
been detailed in the trial evidence, and 
more importantly, granted "freezing" 
relief, ordering officials to apply the 
same standards, administered in the 
same mmmer, to future black applicants 
for registration as they had applied to 
white applicants in the past (p.l 01 ). 
Developed by the Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals in a case from Panola County, 
Mississippi, which in tum had drawn on 
an earlier opinion by Judge Johnson, the 
freezing doctrine was the root of Section 
Five of the VRA, which prevents certain 
jurisdictions from putting new election 
laws or practices into effect without the 
approval ("preclearance") of the DOJ or 
the District Court of the District of 
Columbia (pp.l 05-07, 154, 171 ). 
But the heart of Landsberg's institutional 
incrementalist study, where his prose 
quickens and his analysis deepens, is his 
chapter on Perry County, a desperately 
poor Black Belt county near Selma. The 
childhood home of Carretta Scott, future 
wife of Martin Luther King, Jr., Perry 
County contained both a tradition of 
black independence and education and a 
proclivity towards violence against 
anyone, black or white, who might 
challenge the old racial order- a volatile 
mix. Most important for Landsberg's 
story, the Perry County case was 
presided over by Judge Thomas, one of 
the most intransigent defenders of the 
racial status quo among southem federal 
judges, a man whose actions were key to 
a congressional backlash that led to at 
least two provisions of voting rights 
laws. First, the 1964 Civil Rights Act's 
provision allowing the DOJ to demand a 
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three-judge, rather than a single-judge 
comi to hear certain voting rights cases 
is known infom1ally as "the Thomas 
Amendment," inspired by his dilatory, 
discriminatory tactics in the Perry 
County and other cases (pp.ll8, 134 ). 
Second, a key motive for the section of 
the 1965 VRA that stripped federal 
judges of the power to appoint 
temporary federal voting registrars 
(called "examiners" in the Act) and gave 
it directly to the DOJ was Thomas' 
appointment and repeated support of a 
federal registrar in Perry County who 
was nearly as committed to excluding 
blacks from registration as local officials 
were (pp.l37, 178). Thomas' 
recalcitrance was classic. Having found 
a pattem or practice of discrimination in 
the refusal of Perry County officials to 
register 173 blacks, the judge declared 
that he did "not have the slightest 
intention of doing anything" (p.l25, 
emphasis in original). 
The seven years of DOJ litigation, 
Landsberg suggests, "provided a factual 
predicate" for the legislation and helped 
the DOJ seize control of the framing of 
the Act from the Civil Rights 
Commission, which from 1957 to 1965 
had been as prominent as the DOJ in 
setting federal voting rights policy 
(p.l49). The primary draftsmen ofthe 
Jolmson Administration's voting bill 
were two DOJ lawyers, Harold Greene 
and Louis Claibome, who had recently 
handled appeals in voting rights cases 
from Alabama and Louisiana, including 
the Perry County case (p.155). 
Responding to a November, 1964 
directive by President Johnson, the DOJ 
began planning a bill, presenting their 
superiors with a major draft on May 5, 
1965, two days before Bloody Sunday. 
This draft banned literacy, knowledge, 
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understanding, and "moral character" 
tests, but not poll taxes, in certain 
south em jurisdictions, and it provided 
for administrative appointment of federal 
voting registrars where necessary. 
However, it contained no preclearance 
section, and the Civil Rights 
Commission, not the DOJ, was tasked 
with reviewing requests from states or 
localities to be allowed to continue to 
employ voting tests (pp.l58-159). After 
the crisis in Selma pushed voting rights 
to the top of the Administration's 
agenda, new drafts and memos on the 
issue spewed from the Department. For 
example, the Civil Rights Commission 
was stripped of any institutional role in 
the federal voting rights machinery in 
the second draft of the bill on a single 
day, March 12 (p.l59). 
Although the VRA's most controversial 
provision, Section 5 preclearance, 
originated in the judicial "freezing" 
doctrine championed by the DOJ and 
applied by Judge Johnson in the Elmore 
County case, its development was 
complicated and by no means automatic 
(pp.lOl, 168). A temporary ban on any 
new tests for voting in jurisdictions 
where voting tumout was low and 
literacy tests had been applied was 
proposed in a February, 1965 memo 
produced by the office of Solicitor 
General Archibald Cox. After being 
dropped from intervening proposals, it 
reappeared, for reasons Landsberg does 
not explain, in a May 13 draft (pp.l59-
160). Two days later, in the midst of 
negotiations between the Administration, 
Congress, and civil rights lobbyists, 
legal language allowing appeals of the 
test prohibition to the D.C. District Court 
was added to the bill, along with an 
authorization of suits in the same court 
by states or localities seeking exclusion 
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from the ban through a declaratory 
judgment that they had not engaged in 
racial discrimination in elections for the 
past ten years (pp.l60-161 ). Thus, the 
selective coverage, preclearance, and 
"bail-out" provisions of the law were 
nearly finished by May 15, when 
President Johnson made his famous "We 
Shall Overcome" speech to a joint 
session of Congress, and no local federal 
judge like Daniel H. Thomas would be 
able to protect the discriminators once 
the law passed. Apparently after the 
Administration's bill was introduced, the 
Justice Department was added as a 
forum for preclearance and the ban on 
"tests or devices" was made more 
general- crucial amendments that 
Landsberg does not explain and which 
remain significant subjects for research. 
The DOJ immediately became the 
principal preclearance site, and the 
general description of discriminatory 
laws was used to attack changes in 
electoral structures, as well as in voting 
requirements for individuals. 
Landsberg's contention that the VRA 
was the product not only of the Civil 
Rights Movement, but also ofthe 
succession ofthe 1957, 1960, and 1964 
Civil Rights Acts and the litigation to 
enforce them by the DOJ is persuasive. 
In this case, as in so many expansions of 
Volume 18, No. 1, January 2008 
rights in American history, intransigence 
by opponents not only opened the way 
for change, but shaped its contours 
(pp.l88-189). Facts built up 
incrementally, not principles emerging 
suddenly, largely account for the 
imperfect institutions that guard our civil 
rights, institutions whose structures and 
roles are often in need of refom1 and 
renewal. Landsberg's book is not the 
final word on the subject of the origins 
of all of the provisions of the VRA, but 
it is an important start. 
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